Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Parag Pathak and
Alvin Roth ()
American Economic Review, 2009, vol. 99, issue 5, 1954-78
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
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Working Paper: Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)
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