Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off

S Anukriti

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2018, vol. 10, issue 2, 27-57

Abstract: Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter. Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the fertility-sex ratio conflict.

JEL-codes: I38 J13 J16 J18 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20150234
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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