Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance

Filipe Campante, Quoc-Anh Do and Bernardo Guimaraes

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 3, 298-337

Abstract: We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

JEL-codes: D72 D74 O17 O18 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20170111
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (2019)
Working Paper: Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (2019)
Working Paper: Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (2015)
Working Paper: Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (2015)
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