Leader Selection and Service Delivery in Community Groups: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

Erika Deserranno, Miri Stryjan and Munshi Sulaiman

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 4, 240-67

Abstract: In developing countries, NGOs and governments often rely on local groups for the delivery of financial and public services. This paper studies how the design of rules used for group leader selection affects leader identity and shapes service delivery. To do so, we randomly assign newly formed savings and loan groups to select their leaders using either a public discussion procedure or a private vote procedure. Leaders selected with a private vote are found to be less positively selected on socioeconomic characteristics. This results in groups that are more inclusive toward poor members, without being less economically efficient.

JEL-codes: D72 O16 O17 O22 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20180248
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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