Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms

Stefano Gagliarducci and Marco Manacorda

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2020, vol. 12, issue 2, 67-95

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. Using data for Italy spanning more than three decades on a sample of almost one million individuals plus data on the universe of individuals holding political office, we show that politicians extract significant rents, in terms of private sector jobs, for their family members. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that this phenomenon is a form of corruption, i.e., a quid pro quo exchange between firms and politicians, although arguably an inferior substitute for easier-to-detect modes of rent appropriation on the part of politicians.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 J23 K42 M51 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Politics in the family: nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms (2016)
Working Paper: Politics in the Family Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms (2016)
Working Paper: Politics in the family: Nepotism and the hiring decisionsof Italian firms (2016)
Working Paper: Politics in the Family. Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms (2016)
Working Paper: Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms (2016)
Working Paper: Politics in the Family. Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms (2016)
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DOI: 10.1257/app.20170778

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