Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates

Riako Granzier, Vincent Pons and Clemence Tricaud

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2023, vol. 15, issue 4, 177-217

Abstract: Candidates' placements in polls and past elections can be powerful coordination devices for parties and voters. Using a regression discontinuity design in French two-round elections, we show that candidates who place first in the first round are more likely to stay in the race and win than those who placed second. These effects are even larger for ranking second versus third, and also present for third versus fourth. They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the bandwagon effect of wanting to vote for the winner. We find similar results across 19 other countries.

JEL-codes: D72 D83 D91 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates (2019)
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DOI: 10.1257/app.20210840

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