When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?

Morgan Foy

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 292-322

Abstract: This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 H75 H83 J31 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/app.20220723

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