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What Makes Firm-Based Vocational Training Schemes Successful? The Role of Commitment

Christian Dustmann and Uta Schönberg
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Uta Schoenberg

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 4, issue 2, 36-61

Abstract: This paper studies a possible market failure in the firm-based vocational training market: training may be too complex to be specified in a contract so that it is legally enforceable, resulting in the inability of firms to commit to training provision. We present a model of firm provided training and show that training is substantially lower in the no commitment than in the commitment case. Thus, firm-based vocational training schemes are more successful in countries where commitment to training provision is more widespread. (JEL J24, L25, M12, M53)

JEL-codes: J24 L25 M12 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.4.2.36
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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