Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing Enhancements

David Abrams ()

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 4, issue 4, 32-56

Abstract: Increasing criminal sanctions may reduce crime through two primary mechanisms: deterrence and incapacitation. Disentangling their effects is crucial for optimal policy setting. I use sentence enhancements due to the introduction of state add-on gun laws to isolate the deterrent effect of incarceration. Using cross-state variation in the timing of law passage dates, I find that the average add-on gun law results in a roughly 5 percent decline in gun robberies within the first 3 years. This result is robust to a number of specification tests and does not appear to be associated with large spillovers to other types of crime. (JEL K14, K42)

JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.4.4.32
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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