Checklists and Worker Behavior: A Field Experiment
C. Kirabo Jackson () and
Henry Schneider
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 4, 136-68
Abstract:
We analyze data from a field experiment in which an auto repair firm provided checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher during the experiment, and the effect is equivalent to that of a 1.6 percentage point (10 percent) commission increase. Checklists appear to boost productivity by serving both as a memory aid and a monitoring technology. Despite the large benefits to the firm, mechanics did not use checklists without the firm directly monitoring their use. We show that a moral hazard can explain why mechanics do not otherwise adopt checklists. (JEL C93, D82, L25, L81)
JEL-codes: C93 D82 L25 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20140044
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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