Conflicts of Interest and Steering in Residential Brokerage
Panle Barwick (),
Parag Pathak and
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 3, 191-222
This paper documents uniformity in real estate commission rates offered to buyers' agents using 653,475 residential listings in eastern Massachusetts from 1998–2011. Properties listed with lower commission rates experience less favorable transaction outcomes: they are 5 percent less likely to sell and take 12 percent longer to sell. These adverse outcomes reflect decreased willingness of buyers' agents to intermediate low commission properties (steering), rather than heterogeneous seller preferences or reduced effort of listing agents. Offices with large market shares purchase a disproportionately small fraction of low commission properties. The negative outcomes for low commissions provide empirical support for regulatory concerns over steering.
JEL-codes: D82 L85 R21 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20160214
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... w3Ir9kPLjg-TFoE6J81r (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... kGNIZll1SkcoeG2ImPVw (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... I9P4qwaOAyy5WCsqVWKA (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:9:y:2017:i:3:p:191-222
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics is currently edited by Alexandre Mas
More articles in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().