Low Real Interest Rates, Collateral Misrepresentation, and Monetary Policy

Stephen Williamson

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2018, vol. 10, issue 4, 202-33

Abstract: A model is constructed in which households and banks have incentives to fake the quality of collateral. These incentive problems matter when collateral is scarce in the aggregate—when real interest rates are low. Conventional monetary easing can exacerbate these problems, in that the misrepresentation of collateral becomes more profitable, thus increasing haircuts and interest rate differentials. Central bank purchases of private mortgages may not be feasible, due to misrepresentation of asset quality. If feasible, central bank asset purchase programs work by circumventing suboptimal fiscal policy, not by mitigating incentive problems in asset markets.

JEL-codes: E43 E52 E58 E62 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20150035
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Low Real Interest Rates, Collateral Misrepresentation, and Monetary Policy (2014)
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