Dynamic Capital Tax Competition under the Source Principle

Till Gross (), Paul Klein and Miltiadis Makris

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 3, 365-410

Abstract: We explore the short- and long-run implications of tax competition between jurisdictions, where governments can only tax capital at source. We do this in the context of a neoclassical growth model under commitment and capital mobility. We provide a new theoretical perspective on the dynamic capital tax externalities that emerge in this model. Numerically, we show that the net capital tax externality is positive in the short run but converges to zero in the long run. We also find that noncooperative source-based capital taxes are initially positive and slowly decline toward zero.

JEL-codes: D62 H25 H71 H73 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:365-410

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DOI: 10.1257/mac.20190340

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