Contagious Adverse Selection

Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2012, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-21

Abstract: We illustrate the corrosive effect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and show how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure of "market confidence," defined as approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses. Small probability events can unravel market confidence. We discuss the role of contagious adverse selection and the problem of "toxic assets" in the recent financial crisis. (JEL D82, G01, G12, G14)

JEL-codes: D82 G01 G12 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.1.1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Working Paper: Contagious Adverse Selection (2010)
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