The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts

Silvia Ardagna and Francesco Caselli

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 4, 291-323

Abstract: We review the events that led to the May 2010 and July 2011 bailout agreements. We interpret the bailouts as outcomes of political-economy equilibria. We argue that these equilibria were likely not on the Pareto frontier, and sketch political-economy arguments for why collective policymaking in the Euro area may lead to suboptimal outcomes.

JEL-codes: E58 E62 F34 G01 H61 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.6.4.291
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.6.4.291 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/0604/2012-0042_data.zip (application/zip)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/ds/0604/2012-0042_ds.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:291-323

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics is currently edited by Simon Gilchrist

More articles in American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().