Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure, and Foreclosure

Nadav Levy, Yossi Spiegel and David Gilo

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2018, vol. 10, issue 1, 132-80

Abstract: We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance.

JEL-codes: D21 D43 G34 L13 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160058
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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