Multiple Activities in Networks

Ying-Ju Chen, Yves Zenou and Junjie Zhou

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2018, vol. 10, issue 3, 34-85

Abstract: We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular, that quadratic games with linear best-reply functions aggregate nicely to multiple activities because equilibrium efforts obey similar formulas to that of the one-activity case. We then derive some comparative statics results showing how own productivity affects equilibrium efforts and how network density impacts equilibrium outcomes.

JEL-codes: C72 D11 D85 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160253
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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