Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy

Ravi Jagadeesan

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 3, 191-224

Abstract: Sonmez (2013) and Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer.

JEL-codes: C78 D82 D86 J31 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170192
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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