Information Design

Ina Taneva ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 4, 151-85

Abstract: A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal.

JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170351
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: Information Design (2015)
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