Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment

Drew Fudenberg and Emanuel Vespa

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 4, 186-215

Abstract: We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment.

JEL-codes: C92 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180317
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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