Full Implementation under Ambiguity

Huiyi Guo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 1, 148-78

Abstract: This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value.

JEL-codes: D71 D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180184

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