Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

Tommy Andersson, Ágnes Cseh, Lars Ehlers and Albin Erlanson ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 1, 338-73

Abstract: This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable, agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.

JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180236

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