Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas

Caleb A. Cox and Brock Stoddard

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 2, 343-69

Abstract: We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that communication is largely truthful and increases efficiency. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180275 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E118902V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180275.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180275.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:2:p:343-69

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180275

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().