Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

Florian Engl, Arno Riedl and Roberto Weber

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 4, 261-99

Abstract: Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others' cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.

JEL-codes: C92 D02 D83 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs (2017)
Working Paper: Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences and Beliefs (2017)
Working Paper: Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs (2017)
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180336

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