Orchestrating Information Acquisition

Jingfeng Lu, Lixin Ye and Xin Feng

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 4, 420-65

Abstract: We study how to orchestrate information acquisition in an environment where bidders endowed with original estimates ("types") about their private values can acquire further information by incurring a cost. We consider both single-round and fully sequential short-listing rules. The optimal single-round shortlisting rule admits the set of most efficient bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by the second-stage signal and information acquisition cost. When shortlisting is fully sequential, at each round, the most efficient remaining bidder is admitted provided that her conditional expected contribution to the virtual surplus is positive.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190114

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