Friend-Based Ranking

Francis Bloch and Matthew Olckers

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 2, 176-214

Abstract: We analyze the design of a mechanism to extract a ranking of individuals according to a unidimensional characteristic, such as ability or need. Individuals, connected on a social network, only have local information about the ranking. We show that a planner can construct an ex post incentive compatible and efficient mechanism if and only if every pair of friends has a friend in common. We characterize the windmill network as the sparsest social network for which the planner can always construct a complete ranking.

JEL-codes: D11 D82 D83 D85 O12 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Friend-Based Ranking (2022)
Working Paper: Friend-Based Ranking (2022)
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190333

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