Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games

Burkhard Schipper

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 3, 321-52

Abstract: We show there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable, or that could "learn itself." Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach a learning opponent to secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff. This observation holds even when we restrict to generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements, or 2 x 2 games, in which learning is known to be "nice." It also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria, rationalizability, iterated admissibility, or minimal CURB sets.

JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games (2017)
Working Paper: Strategic teaching and learning in games (2015)
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170139

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