Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games

Eray Cumbul

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 3, 441-79

Abstract: We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games and it decreases in the remaining three games. Finally, we characterize the conditions for payoffs and welfare to increase with more precise private or public information. We also provide robustness checks when the values are private.

JEL-codes: C70 D43 D82 D83 H41 Q21 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190059

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