Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach

Geoffroy de Clippel and Kareen Rozen

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 3, 810-36

Abstract: We experimentally investigate how impartial observers allocate money to agents whose complementarity and substitutability determine the surplus that each group can achieve. Analyzing the data through the lens of axioms and solutions from cooperative game theory, a one-parameter model (mixing equal split and Shapley value) arises as a parsimonious description of the data.

JEL-codes: C71 C91 D12 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach (2020)
Working Paper: Fairness Through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach (2014)
Working Paper: Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach (2013)
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200015

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