Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models

Drew Fudenberg and Gustav Karreskog Rehbinder

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 1, 1-32

Abstract: We use simulations of a simple learning model to predict cooperation rates in the experimental play of the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We suppose that learning and the game parameters only influence play in the initial round of each supergame, and that after these rounds, play depends only on the outcome of the previous round. We find that our model predicts out-of-sample cooperation at least as well as models with more parameters and harder-to-interpret machine learning algorithms. Our results let us predict the effect of session length and help explain past findings on the role of strategic uncertainty.

JEL-codes: C57 C72 C73 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220148 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E182668V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220148.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220148.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:1:p:1-32

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220148

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().