Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
Fabian Dvorak and
Sebastian Fehrler
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 232-58
Abstract:
Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperation under different monitoring structures. Pre-play communication reduces strategic uncertainty and facilitates very high cooperation rates at the beginning of an interaction. Under perfect monitoring, this is sufficient to reach a high and stable cooperation rate. However, repeated communication is important to maintain a high level of cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where players face additional uncertainty about the history of play.
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:232-58
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210117
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