Monopolization with Must-Haves
Enrique Ide and
Juan-Pablo Montero
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 284-320
Abstract:
An increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of "must-have" items: products that distributors must carry to "compete effectively." Motivated by these cases, we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one-stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit this must-have property, along with tying and exclusivity provisions, to monopolize adjacent, otherwise-competitive markets. Policy interventions that ban tying or exclusivity provisions may prove ineffective or even backfire.
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L13 L14 L42 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:284-320
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230018
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