One Man, One Vote

Romans Pancs and Tridib Sharma

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, vol. 17, issue 1, 171-205

Abstract: In the United States, electoral districts must be equipopulous. This requirement is known as the one man, one vote doctrine. We propose welfare-based justifications for this requirement under the economic view, according to which voters care about the policy, and under the political view, according to which voters care about representation. Both justifications assume that the districter is partisan. If the districter is benevolent, one man, one vote is harmless underview by as much as the reduction from K to square root of K districts would.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230115

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