Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining

Topi Miettinen and Christoph Vanberg

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, vol. 17, issue 1, 206-37

Abstract: We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.

JEL-codes: C78 D71 D72 F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining (2024)
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230208

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