Dynamic Preference "Reversals" and Time Inconsistency

Philipp Strack and Dmitry Taubinsky

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2026, vol. 18, issue 2, 426-68

Abstract: We study the possibility of identifying time-inconsistent preferences in empirical designs where preferences are elicited in advance at time 0 and then again at time 1, after the agent receives additional information. For single-peaked preferences, time consistency is rejected only when the time-1 ranking between a pair of alternatives is always the reverse of the time-0 ranking. We establish variations and generalizations of this result. Since such stark reversals are rarely observed, choice-revision designs require stronger identification assumptions than perhaps previously appreciated. But we show that time inconsistency is identifiable in environments where preferences over alternatives can be "priced out."

JEL-codes: D11 D15 D83 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230120

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