Optimal Design of Market Access

Takuro Yamashita and Shuguang Zhu

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2026, vol. 18, issue 3, 1-38

Abstract: We study a data provider's problem of optimally designing and selling marketing lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer's types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple "fixed-price" implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing.

JEL-codes: D82 L81 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240324

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