The 1/d Law of Giving
Jacob Goeree,
Margaret A. McConnell,
Tiffany Mitchell,
Tracey Tromp and
Leeat Yariv
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, vol. 2, issue 1, 183-203
Abstract:
We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics with experimental observations from dictator games. Dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance, giving follows a simple inverse distance law. While student demographics play a minor role in explaining offer amounts, individual heterogeneity is important for network formation. In particular, we detect significant homophilous behavior; students connect to others similar to themselves. Moreover, the network data reveal a strong preference for cliques, students connect to those already close. The study is one of the first to identify network architecture with individual behavior in a strategic context. (JEL D44, H82)
JEL-codes: D44 H82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.1.183
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (68)
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