Fraternities and Labor-Market Outcomes

Sergey Popov and Dan Bernhardt

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012, vol. 4, issue 1, 116-41

Abstract: We model how student choices to rush a fraternity, and fraternity admission choices, interact with signals firms receive about student productivities to determine labor-market outcomes. The fraternity and students value wages and fraternity socializing values. We provide sufficient conditions under which, in equilibrium, most members have intermediate abilities: weak students apply, but are rejected unless they have high socializing values, while most able students do not apply to avoid taint from association with weaker members. (JEL C72, J24, J31, Z13)

JEL-codes: C72 J24 J31 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.1.116
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Fraternities and labor market outcomes (2009)
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