Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

Marina Agranov and Andrew Schotter

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012, vol. 4, issue 2, 77-103

Abstract: We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)

JEL-codes: C71 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.2.77
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