Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

Jeremy Fox and Patrick Bajari

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 5, issue 1, 100-146

Abstract: We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)

JEL-codes: D44 D45 H82 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Working Paper: Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction (2005)
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