Competition and the Use of Foggy Pricing

Eugenio Miravete ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 5, issue 1, 194-216

Abstract: Firms engage in foggy pricing when the menu of tariff options aims at profiting from consumer mistakes. The analysis of this paper concludes that the transition from monopoly to competition in the early US cellular telephone industry does not generally foster the use of such deceptive strategies. I offer three alternative measures to account for the fogginess of the menu of options offered by cellular carriers. All results are robust to the existence of uncertainty regarding future consumption at the time of choosing a particular tariff option, as well as to consumers' heterogeneity with respect to cellular telephone usage. (JEL D03, L11, L12, L13, L96)

JEL-codes: D03 L11 L12 L13 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.194
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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