Strategic Tournaments

Ayala Arad and Ariel Rubinstein ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 5, issue 4, 31-54

Abstract: A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behavior

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.4.31 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mic/ds/november2013/2012-0089_ds.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Tournaments (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:4:p:31-54

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().