House Allocation with Overlapping Generations

Morimitsu Kurino

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 1, 258-89

Abstract: Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for only a few years. A student is a "newcomer" in the beginning and then becomes an "existing tenant". Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we examine two static rules of serial dictatorship and top trading cycles. We support these seniority-based rules in terms of their dynamic Pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility

JEL-codes: D13 D61 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.258
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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