The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early

Eddie Dekel and Michele Piccione

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 4, 162-79

Abstract: Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting).

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.162
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.6.4.162 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mic/ds/0604/2012-0009_ds.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The strategic dis/advantage of voting early (2014)
Working Paper: The Strategic Disadvantage of Voting Early (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:162-79

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().