The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 1, 144-64

Abstract: We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching ? in the set for which ?(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. (JEL C78)

JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130089
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: The core matchings of markets with transfers (2008)
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