Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms

Alejandro Francetich

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 2, 45-76

Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of sequentially allocating time sensitive goods, or one-period leases on a durable good, among agents who compete through time and learn about the common component of their valuation privately through experience. I show that efficiency is unattainable, and I identify simple variations of sequential second price or English auctions that implement the second best and the revenue-maximizing auctions. When the units are divisible, I identify the corresponding auctions that allow for double sourcing. (JEL D44, D82)

JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130226
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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