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Cyber-Shilling in Automobile Auctions: Evidence from a Field Experiment

David Grether, David Porter and Matthew Shum ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 3, 85-103

Abstract: We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the "price grid," or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent group of buyers suggesting that they are "cyber-shills" working on behalf of sellers. These patterns do not appear in the New York auctions. (JEL C93, D12, D44, L62, L81)

JEL-codes: C93 D12 D44 L62 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20120085
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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:85-103