Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency

Matthew Jackson and Leeat Yariv

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 4, 150-78

Abstract: We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive. (JEL D71, D72, D91)

JEL-codes: D71 D72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140161
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (111)

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