Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms

Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia and M. Bumin Yenmez

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016, vol. 8, issue 2, 202-14

Abstract: We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents. (JEL C78, D82)

JEL-codes: C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150035
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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