The (Human) Sampler's Curses
Mark Thordal-Le Quement
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016, vol. 8, issue 4, 115-48
Abstract:
We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are either unbiased or wish to maximize R's action, bias being unobservable. Consultation is costly and R cannot commit to future consultation behavior. We find that individual expert informativeness negatively relates to consultation extensiveness and expert trustworthiness due to biased experts' incentive to discourage further consultation by mimicking unbiased experts. We identify three (sampler's) curses: R may lose from an increase in the number or in the trustworthiness of experts as well as from a decrease in consultation costs.
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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